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Abstract
Operating overheads are widespread and lead to concentrated bursts of activity.
To transfer resources between active and idle spells, agents demand ﬁnancial assets.
Futures contracts and lotteries are unsuitable, as they have substantial overheads of
their own.We show thatmoney – under eﬃcientmonetary policy – is a liquid asset that
leads to eﬃcient allocations. Under all other policies, agents follow ineﬃcient “money
cycle” patterns of saving, activity, and inactivity. Agents spend their money too quickly
– a “hot potato eﬀect of inﬂation”. We show that inﬂation can stimulate ineﬃciently
high aggregate output.
 Introduction
Operating overheads are widespread. Workers prepare for work by dressing professionally,
travelling to work – oen in peak traﬃc, re-familiarising themselves with their work plans
(leaving family plans on hold), and checking in with colleagues. In manufacturing, signif-
icant engineering eﬀort is applied to replace inventories with “just-in-time” production.
But, when overheads can not be engineered away, activities are concentrated into bursts
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and batches. For example, oil tankers have high operating costs leading to large volumes
being transported at a time, retailers restock with large deliveries, dry cleaners concentrate
into batches due to the ﬁxed cost of heating the drums, and income tax is evaluated every
year.ese bursts lead to demand for ﬁnancial assets: holding large inventories typically in-
volves trade credit, consignment, or futures contracts, andworkers’ rostersmight be chosen
by lottery. However, these assets all involve substantial overheads of their own. All of these
assets involve the possibility of default, which is minimised with costly credit checks, col-
lateral, and intermediation. Lotteries are particularly cumbersome: (i) to prevent default,
money or some collateral would have to be posted before the winner is announced, and (ii)
lotteries have a divisibility problem; for example ﬁve people are required if they would all
like a  chance to work  hours (or win ). However, there is one asset with very
little overhead, namely money. Instead of buying from suppliers using trade credit, buyers
could use money saved from previous sales to pay on delivery. Instead of random shi ros-
ters, workers might decide to produce more on work days and save money to fund days
oﬀ.Money is divisible, recognisable, and storable, giving it minimal transaction costs. Does
this mean money is useful for overcoming overheads in productive activities?
To answer this question, we study a simple economy with a single productive activity.
Output can be produced from labour, where an overhead of labour is required to begin pro-
duction, and there is diminishing marginal productivity. Output is non-storable, and must
be traded or consumed immediately. We compare the social planner’s preferred allocations
with equilibrium allocations in which the agents can hold and trade money.
Focusing our attention on a utilitarian social planner, we ﬁnd that he prefers to allo-
cate equal consumption to all agents. He prefers to make all work shis the same length,
but is indiﬀerent between all feasible work shi allocations. is generalises the results by
Rogerson () and Prescott, Rogerson andWallenius ().e key step is to show that
the social planner’s problem with overheads is equivalent to a convexiﬁed social planner’s
problem in which the production technology no longer has any overheads.
Can money achieve utilitarian-optimal allocations? We ﬁrst study monetary equilibria
when money is supplied with lump-sum taxation to support deﬂation at the rate of time
preference, i.e. the Friedman rule. We ﬁnd that all equilibria involve a “working class” and
possibly a “leisure class” of agents. Working class agents consume the same amount every
period, produce more than they consume in the long run, and may sometimes take a vaca-
tion. Members of the leisure class consume more than the working class and never work.
Equilibria in which the leisure class is absent are utilitarian-optimal.
However,money is not perfectly frictionless, and is rarely supplied at the Friedman rule.
How does money perform away from socially optimal monetary policy? We develop a the-
ory that characterises all stationary symmetric monetary equilibria.We ﬁnd that only equi-
libria approximating the utilitarian-optimal working class equilibria exist. In these equilib-

ria, all agents proceed through a “money cycle” pattern of ﬁnite length of saving, produc-
tion, and consumption. All aggregates are stationary – agents are at diﬀerent phases of their
cycle at any given moment. ere is a “hot potato eﬀect of inﬂation” which induces agents
to spend their money too quickly on consumption, and hence render these money cycle
equilibria ineﬃcient.
We highlight some surprising features of our model, by refuting four conjectures that
we argue are natural in the context of the monetary literature. First, we show that inﬂation
need not depress economic activity, even in a model of complete information. Second, we
show that even when consumption and leisure are normal goods, wealthier agents do not
consume more and work less. ird, we show that Baumol-Tobin style Ss cycles are not the
only possible money cycle structure. Finally, we show that symmetric equilibria need not
exist, and two money cycles can co-exist in asymmetric equilibria.
Ourwork is related to three strands of literature. One literature is about the optimal allo-
cation of labourwhen there are large setup costs. In theRogerson ()model, labour is in-
divisible. He found that lotteries are eﬃcient for convexifying the indivisibility. In Prescott
et al. (), households choose their work intensity in continuous time when facing a
non-concave production function. In this setting, equilibria with complete markets are
utilitarian-optimal. Our work characterises all utilitarian-optimal allocations, shows that
eﬃcient monetary policy is equivalent to complete markets, and characterises equilibria
under realistic monetary frictions.
Another literature is about ﬁnancial frictions in converting ﬁnancial assets into money.
e only asset in our model is money, and this literature suggests a path forward for intro-
ducing other assets. Baumol () and Tobin () study a partial equilibrium model of
money, when there is a ﬁxed cost of liquidating an asset with high return.ey show that an
Ss policy is optimal (unlike in our setting). Alvarez, Atkeson and Kehoe () also think
about a ﬁxed cost of liquidating ﬁnancial assets, but assume that agents can not holdmoney
across periods. Kaplan and Violante () numerically explore a model with a ﬁxed cost
of liquidating high-return assets, and calculate the equilibrium response to ﬁscal stimulus
payments. eir equilibrium calculations are complicated, but have a similar nature to our
money cycle equilibria. eir agents proceed through Ss cycles involving a single liquida-
tion, but we expect more complicated patterns akin to our money cycles would arise with
an increasing marginal cost of liquidation.
Finally, our work is related to several monetary theories based on double-coincidence
frictions in the tradition of Kiyotaki and Wright (). Faig () and Menzio, Shi and
Sun () explore the use of money and lotteries to smooth out an overhead, namely sell-
ers forego the opportunity to be buyers. In Faig (), sellers can only serve one buyer
per period, so in equilibrium, workers never save for more than one vacation. Menzio et al.
() introduce ﬁrms to accommodatemultilateral matching, so that workers save for sev-

eral vacation periods. is leads the money distribution to be non-degenerate, and allows
them to study how inﬂation aﬀects people holding diﬀerent amounts of money. ey ﬁnd
that wealthier agents consume more. In contrast, we ﬁnd that the poorest agents consume
the most and that the wealth eﬀect is non-monotonic.
emicro-foundedmonetary literature also includes several papers that explorewhether
inﬂation can stimulate economic activity. Ennis () ﬁnds that inﬂation can increase
search activity, but does not investigate the eﬀect on productive activities; he also ﬁnds that
agents front-load consumption. Nosal () studies a stylised model in which buyers are
sent to the back of the queue aer trading, which leads to a perverse incentive to avoid
trade. He ﬁnds that inﬂation is welfare-improving and increases aggregate output because
the hot-potato eﬀect oﬀsets the trade-avoidance incentive. Other papers in this literature
include Berentsen, Camera and Waller () and Liu, Wang and Wright ().
is paper is organised as follows. Section  introduces a model in which agents have
access to ﬁat money and incur overheads in economic activity. Section  characterises eﬃ-
cient allocations, with particular attention to utilitarian-optimal allocations. We then char-
acterise the allocations that may arise under eﬃcient monetary policy in Section . is
monetary policy is implausible, so in Section  we characterise the equilibria that arise un-
der ineﬃcient monetary policy. We use this theory to address several natural conjectures
that arise in various literatures in Section . Section  reﬂects on the contribution of the
paper. Appendix A discusses a related model in which agents trade Lucas trees rather than
money. Appendix B addresses some diﬃculties in calculating money cycle equilibria.
 Environment
We construct a stationary general equilibriummodel in inﬁnite discrete time where agents
discount at rate . ere is a continuum of agents i 2 [0; 1] who may produce any quantity
qt  0 of a homogeneous consumption good at cost c (qt) in period t. We assume that the
production cost c (q) is strictly increasing, convex on (0;1), and diﬀerentiable on (0;1),
but allow for a discontinuity at q = 0which represents a ﬁxed cost. Not producing anything
is free, i.e. c (0) = 0. Agents receive utility u (xt) from consuming xt  0 units of this
good.We assume that u is strictly increasing, diﬀerentiable, concave, and satisﬁes the Inada
conditions limx!0+ u0(x) =1; limx!0+ u(x) =  1:
roughout the paper, we assume that the consumption good is non-storable¹. How-
ever, agents have access to ﬁat money, which they can trade for goods without incurring
¹ Non-monetary equilibria with storable goods are equivalent to monetary equilibria with zero inﬂation.
Under deﬂation, agents would choose to hold money rather than store goods.
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any ﬁxed costs.² If an agent produces more than he consumes, he may sell the surplus for
money on a spot market at the price pt. Conversely, an agent can consume more than he
produces buy trading at the same price pt. Since other types of assets such as bonds, loans,
and stocks involve transaction costs, agents would use money to smooth those costs out
as well. For simplicity, we focus on just one ﬁxed cost – in the production cost function –
by excluding all non-monetary assets. LetMt be the aggregate stock of money in nominal
terms at the beginning of period t. We assume that it evolves over time depending on a
lump sum transfer Tt issued by the government to all agents before starting to trade goods
so that Mt+1 = Mt + Tt. We write 1 + t+1 = Mt+1/Mt, where  is the money growth
rate. roughout the analysis, we take the government’s monetary policy as exogenous so
thatMt, t and Tt are exogenous variables.
If an agent holdsmt units of money at time t, his optimal choices satisfy the following
Bellman equation
~Vt (m) = max
q2R+; x2R+;m02R+
u (x)  c (q) +  ~Vt+1 (m0)
s.t. ptxt +mt+1 = ptqt +mt + Tt:
()
We focus on stationary equilibria under a stationary monetary policy, so that the real
transfer is stationary with T = Tt/pt and inﬂation is stationary with  = t. Note that T –
unlike Tt – is endogenous because it is deﬁned in terms of prices which are endogenous. Let
Zt = Mt/pt be the real value of the money stock. In a stationary equilibrium, the money
growth rateMt+1/Mt = 1 +  coincides with the inﬂation rate pt+1/pt. SinceMt + Tt =
(1 + )Mt, or in real terms, Zt + T = (1 + )Zt, the real money stock is stationary and
can be expressed asZ = T/.Whenwe replace the nominal balancesmt with real balances
zt = mt/pt, the problem becomes stationary:
V (z) = max
q2R+;x2R+;z02R+
u (x)  c (q) + V (z0)
s.t. x+ (1 + ) z0 = q + z + T:
()
We write the optimal production quantity as q (z) and the optimal consumption policy
as x (z). e distribution of real money holdings is F . A symmetric stationary equilibrium
in this environment is a tuple
[x (z) ; q (z) ; F (z) ; T ]
such that
² In Appendix A, we explore how our analysis would change if agents could trade Lucas trees instead of
money. We focus on money in the body of the paper because money has very small overheads.
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• the policies q (z) and x (z) solve the stationary problem () given T ;
• goods and money markets clear so that supply equals demand:Z
q (z) dF (z) =
Z
x (z) dF (z) and
T

=
Z
z dF (z) ;
• the distribution of money holdings is stationary:
F (z0) =
Z
I f [q (z)  x (z) + z + T ]/ (1 + )  z0g dF (z)
which means that the measure of agents holding less than or equal to z0 real balances
of money at the beginning of the next period has to equal the measure that saved z0
or less by working, consuming, and getting lump sum transfers.
 Eﬃcient Allocations
We characterise the eﬃcient allocations of consumption and production when there are
ﬁxed costs of production. In this section, we focus most of our attention on a utilitarian
social planner that puts equal welfare weight on all agents. We ﬁnd that this planner allo-
cates each agent a mix of “full-time” shis and vacations. He allocates each agent the same
consumption, but does not attempt to allocate shis evenly – he is indiﬀerent among all
feasible shi allocations.
Our proof technique is to introduce a second production cost function, namely the con-
vex hull of the economy’s production cost (see Figure ).Weﬁnd that a general class of social
planners’ values are the same, regardless of which production cost function he faces. We
then solve the utilitarian social planner’s convexiﬁed problem to characterise utilitarian-
optimal allocations.
e social planner prioritises the utility of agent i 2 [0; 1] according to aNegishi weight,
i. e social planner calculates social welfare as
W () = max
fxit;qitg
Z
[0;1]
i
1X
t=0
t[u(xit)  c(qit)]di ()
s.t.
Z
[0;1]
[xit   qit]di = 0 for all t. ()
Our approach is to study an equivalent social planner’s problem that is easier to solve.
We will establish that the (non-convex) production cost function, c() has a range of redun-
dant output levels, (0; q) that the social planner would never wish to allocate to any worker.

qq
q
c (q)c (q)
Figure : e convex hull of the cost function
We reduce the costs of these redundant outputs as far as we can while still keeping them
redundant, i.e. until the planner is indiﬀerent between allocating them to some workers or
not. e resulting production cost function is the convex hull, denoted c(), and is depicted
in Figure . Formally speaking, it is the upper envelope of all aﬃne functions that lie be-
low c(). e convex hull is linear on (0; q), and coincides with the original cost function
elsewhere.³
e ﬁrst part of eorem  veriﬁes that indeed, the social planner has the same value
under either production cost function, precisely because they only diﬀer on redundant
choices (0; q). e convexiﬁed problem is simpler, because there is no longer any need to
treat agents diﬀerently to avoid the ineﬃcient output levels (0; q). erefore, the remaining
parts of the theorem focus on utilitarian social welfare that allocates equal weight to each
agent. Part (ii) ﬁnds that autarky is a utilitarian-optimal allocation, where agents consume
and produce the x that solves
u0(x) = c0(x): ()
But this is not the only utilitarian-optimal allocation. e linear section of c() also leads
uneven workloads to be utilitarian-optimal.
Part (iii) uses this characterisation of the convexiﬁed problem to understand the orig-
inal social planner’s problem. While the autarky allocation is optimal in the convexiﬁed
³ Note that when c() has constant marginal cost, it never intersects its convex hull c() above q = 0. We
focus on economies in which the marginal cost increases to inﬁnity.
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problem, we know that it is ineﬃcient in the original problem. Nevertheless, since the so-
cial welfare in both problems is equal, it follows that there must be some way to rearrange
production to achieve the same level of welfare in the original problem.
Part (iv) calculates utilitarian welfare by using the autarky allocation.
eorem . (i) e social planner’s problem and the convexiﬁed social planner’s problem
coincide, i.e.W () = W () for all .
For the remaining parts, suppose x  q and  = 1, i.e. i = 1 for all i.
(ii) All solutions to the convexiﬁed social planner’s problem involve xit = x
 and qit 2
[0; q] for almost all (i; t).
(iii) All solutions to the social planner’s problem involve xit = x
 and qit 2 f0; qg for
almost all (i; t).
(iv) W (1) = W (1) = u(x
) c(x)
1  .
Proof. (i) We ﬁrst note thatW ()  W (), because c(q)  c(q) for all q, i.e. the con-
vexiﬁed problem is a relaxation of the original problem.
To show that W ()  W (), we ﬁrst simplify both functions. e additively sepa-
rable nature of the social planner’s problem means that it can be reformulated recur-
sively as
W () = max
fxi;qig
Z
[0;1]
i[u(xi)  c(qi)]di+ W () ()
s.t.
Z
[0;1]
[xi   qi]di = 0: ()
is means the social planner’s problem is essentially a static problem (unlike the
agent’s problem in the monetary economy). A similar reformulation is possible for
the convexiﬁed social planner’s problem.
To show thatW ()  W (), we show that any solution fxi ; qi g to the later can be
transformed into a solution of the former without any loss of social welfare. Now,
let A = fi : qi 2 (0; q)g be the set of agents who work strictly between 0 and q
hours. We will exploit the linearity of the convexiﬁed cost function c() on [0; q] to
rearrange these workers’ hours to the boundary, f0; qg, where c() and c() coincide.
If the (Lebesgue) measure of these agents (A) is zero, then no rearrangement is
necessary. Suppose then that(A) > 0. In this case, imust be the same for almost all
workers in A. (Otherwise, the social planner would strictly prefer to reallocate work

from workers with high Negishi weights to those with low Negishi weights, violating
the optimality of fxi ; qi g.) Since i is the same number for almost all agents in A,
the social planner is indiﬀerent about reallocating work to the boundaries, 0 and q.
erefore, this reallocation has the same value in both social planner problems, and
impliesW ()  W ().
(ii) Now suppose that fxi ; qi g is a solution to the convexiﬁed problem in which i =
1 for all i. We consider two possible reallocations the social planner might make:
(a) instructing agent i to give  of his consumption up in favour of agent j, and (b)
instructing agent i to change his production and consumption by the same amount,
. Since these reallocations involving only a ﬁnite number of agents, they do not aﬀect
social welfare. However, the per-agent objectives
iu(x

i   ) + ju(xj + )
i[u(x

i + )  c(qi + )]
are maximised by  = 0 for almost all agents (or pairs of agents in the ﬁrst case).
Since the Negishi weights are equal, we obtain the ﬁrst-order conditions,
u0(xi ) = u
0(xj)
u0(xi ) = c
0(qi ) if q

i > 0.
e ﬁrst equality implies that almost all agents consume the same amount, which
we denote x. e second equality implies that either almost all produce the same
amount q > q or almost all agents produce in the range [0; q]. e former case is
impossible, as the resource constraint would imply x = q = x, violating the
condition that x < q. erefore, u0(x) = c0(q), which implies x = x.
erefore, almost all agents consume x and produce in [0; q] in solutions to the con-
vexiﬁed social planners problem when x < q and all agents are equally weighted.
(iii) is follows from parts (i) and (ii).
(iv) Part (ii) found the autarky allocation involving consumption and production of x
is utilitarian-optimal in the convexiﬁed problem. erefore, utilitarian welfare is
W (1) = W (1) =
Z
[0;1]
u(x)  c(x)
1   di =
u(x)  c(x)
1   : ()

Prescott et al. (, Sections  and ) study the social planner’s problem in a related
environment with a non-concave production function. Our analysis is a somewhat more
complicated, because we accommodate agents that discount that future and because we
accommodate non-utilitarian social planners. Apart from that, they assume time is contin-
uous, where each instant is interpreted as one week, and that agents have ﬁnite lifetimes.
e main conclusions are the same: the utilitarian social planner has all agents consume
the same amount at all times, and work the same hours as each other (during work weeks).
eir paper in turn builds on the work of Rogerson (), in which workers live for one
period and make a single indivisible labour choice. at paper found that lotteries are ef-
ﬁcient. Lotteries would also be utilitarian-optimal in our economy and in the economy of
Prescott et al. (), if they were available.
 Eﬃcient Saving with Money
Real-world market institutions involve a wide range of frictions that leaves a gap between
eﬃcient and equilibrium allocations. As discussed in the introduction, we focus on mon-
etary institutions, rather than credit, lotteries, bonds, or capital, which involve substantial
ﬁxed costs.is section argues that an idealised form of monetary institutions (with an un-
realistic monetary policy) leads to utilitarian-optimal allocations. is result will help us
understand the frictions of more realistic monetary policies in the next section.
e previous section established that utilitarian-optimal allocations involve constant
consumption, a constant work shi length, and vacations. is means agents need a way
to save for vacations. Money is one such institution. Monetary policy – speciﬁcally, the
return of holding money (1 + ) – determines the agent’s incentive to save and smooth
out consumption. We need a policy that makes the agent reject deviating from stationary
consumption by saving an extra unit of money. is is the case when the return of holding
money equals the discount rate, i.e. the Friedman rule, 1+ = . We ﬁnd that a large class
of equilibria are possible, but argue that only the utilitarian-optimal equilibria are robust.
Our study of the agent’s problem mirrors that of the social planner’s problem in the
previous section. In eorem , we establish that the agent’s value of holding money is the
same, regardless of whether the agent faces production cost c() or the convexiﬁed cost
function c(). at allows us to show that agents either take vacations or work a full shi,
when they are tight on money (we call them “working class”), or they never work and con-
sume their return on savings (we call these agents “leisure class”). We will argue below that
only equilibria without any leisure class are robust. Part (iv) establishes that these robust
equilibria are utilitarian-optimal.

eorem . Let V be the agent’s convexiﬁed value function. Suppose that x  q. For every
real value of transfers T at the Friedman rule, there is a cut-oﬀ z = (x   T )/(1  ) such
that:
(i) e agent’s actual and convexiﬁed value functions coincide, with
V (z) = V (z) =
u(x)  c(x)
1   + c
0(q)(z   Z) ()
for all z 2 [0; z], where Z = T/,
(ii) agents with z < z (“working class”) consume x every period, and only ever produce
0 or q,
(iii) agents with z > z (“leisure class”) consume z(1 ) T > x every period and never
work, and
(iv) all symmetric stationary equilibria [x(); q(); F (); T ] without any leisure class are
utilitarian-optimal, i.e.Z
V (z) dF (z) = W (1) =
u(x)  c(x)
1   :
Proof. (i) We guess-and-verify that V as deﬁned in () is a ﬁxed-point of the agent’s
convexiﬁed problem’s Bellman operator,
(V )(z) = max
x;q
u(x)  c(q) + V

z + q + T   x
1 + 

s.t. x  z + q + T:
Technically speaking, we only claim this is the formula for V on a subset of its domain.
If the agent has a large amount of savings (above x/(1  ) + Z), he can aﬀord to
buy x and pay the lump-sum tax  T from the return and never work again; in
this case, the marginal value of z has curvature, so the linear formula overestimates
V . erefore, it suﬃces to check that the relevant portion of V is unchanged by the
Bellman operator, despite V (z) being too large for large z. Applying the Bellman
operator to V under the Friedman rule 1 +  =  gives
( V )(z) = max
x;q
u(x)  c(q) + c0(q)(z + q + T   x  Z) + u(x
)  c(x)
1  
s.t. x  z + q + T:

First-order conditions give x = x and the agent being indiﬀerent between choosing
any feasible q 2 [0; q].⁴ For simplicity, we choose q = x = x:
( V )(z) = u(x)  c(x) + c0(q)(z + T   Z) + u(x
)  c(x)
1  
=
u(x)  c(x)
1   + c
0(q)(z   Z)
= V (z):
us, we have veriﬁed the formula () for V , and that there exists an optimal policy
involving q(z) 2 f0; qg for all z.
We now establish that V = V . Since V is the value of a relaxed problem, we know that
V (z)  V (z) for all z. Since an optimal solution of the relaxed problem is feasible in
the original problem, we know that V (z)  V (z). We conclude that V = V .
(ii) First, we claim that only q 2 f0; qg can be optimal choices. Suppose for the sake of
contradiction, that q^ 2 (0; q) were optimal at z^ < z. is would imply c(q^) > c(q^),
and hence V (z^) > V (z^), which violates (i).
Second, the optimal consumption choice in both problems is the same, because in
both cases, the ﬁrst-order conditions imply u0(x) = c0(q):
(iii) If z  z, the agent may wish to choose z0 > z, so () does not apply. Nevertheless,
the Euler equation u0(x) = /(1 + )u0(x0) = u0(x0) holds, so the agent chooses
constant consumption. (See Lemma  below.) e agent can aﬀord to consume at
least z+T = x, so themarginal utility of consumption u0(x) is lower than the
marginal cost of working, c0(q), so this agent never works.e agent never transitions
to become working class – otherwise, his consumption would drop to x, violating
the Euler equation.
(iv) Follows from ().
It is well-known that the Friedman rule monetary policy oen has a large class of equi-
libria that do not survive when the monetary policy is changed slightly. We argue that equi-
libria involving a leisure class are exotic in this sense. e corollary below establishes that
leisure class equilibria do exist at the Friedman rule, but we establish in the next section
that they do not exist for any other monetary policy. is means only utilitarian-optimal
equilibria have any counterpart away from the Friedman rule.
⁴ It follows from x  q that the agent chooses q  q.

e simplest leisure class equilibrium involves the leisure class extracting all the surplus
from the working class. In this “exploitation” equilibrium, the working class agents work
every day, while the leisure class agents never work and live oﬀ the return from holding
money.
Corollary .. If x  q, then for any measure of working class agents, e 2 [x/q; 1), there
exists an (“exploitation”) equilibrium with the following properties:
(i) Lump-sum transfers are T =  (q   x).
(ii) Working class agents never take vacations and hold z = 0. (ey work q and consume
x every period, as before.)
(iii) Leisure class agents consume xl = e
1 e q every period and hold z =
xl T

. (ey never
work, as before.)
Proof. It is straightforward to verify that under the proposed consumption and work poli-
cies, the conjectured distribution of money holdings is stationary.
By eorem  part (ii), the agents holding money z = 0 are working class, and prefer
to consume x every period and to work q 2 f0; qg. Since only q = q is feasible at z = 0,
we conclude the working class choose to work every period.
When the size of the working class e is suﬃciently large, the agents holding z = x
l T

are above the leisure class cut-oﬀ of eorem  part (iii). According to the theorem, these
agents prefer to consume xl every period and never work.
e quantity xl was chosen so that the goods market clears. Walras’ law then implies
that the money market also clears.
Prescott et al. () also consider equilibria that implement eﬃcient allocations. ey
study an Arrow-Debreu economy in which agents can eﬀectively borrow and save at the
frictionless interest rate. In the monetary economy we study, agents can not hold negative
money balances, and are therefore credit constrained. is means that every utilitarian-
optimal monetary equilibrium at the Friedman rule is an equilibrium in their economy,
but not vice versa. Agents in their economy are only endowed with time (and not money),
so no leisure class equilibrium can arise.
 Ineﬃcient Money Cycles
e previous section studied an idealised version of monetary institutions, in which the
value of money deﬂates at precisely the rate of time preferences. Such a monetary policy is
diﬃcult to implement, as it requires subsidisingmoney holders, and doing so at a knife-edge

rate. Even slightly over-subsidising money leads to fundamental non-existence problems
(agents want to hold too much money, and the money market does not clear). erefore,
we study the more realistic situation in whichmoney is under-subsidised, i.e. with inﬂation
or less deﬂation than the Friedman rule.
In eorem , we establish that away from the Friedman rule, agents’ decisions follow
ﬁnite money cycles that begin with no money holdings in every stationary equilibrium.
We show that money can only have value for money cycles of length two or more. In a
money cycle equilibrium, the distribution of money holdings is non-trivial, with a ﬁnite
support. In eorem , we characterize the choices throughout each cycle. First, agents
front-load consumption in response to the inﬂation tax. We interpret this as a hot potato
eﬀect of inﬂation. Second, agents also attempt to back-load production, but this is limited
by the no-credit constraint and their preference to front-load consumption. ird, money
cycles begin with work in the ﬁrst period and end with a vacation in the last period. In
Corollary ., we show that when agents face a constant marginal production cost, money
cycles have a monotonic Baumol-Tobin structure with only one work day. However, we
provide an example with increasing marginal cost in which the money holdings are not
monotonically decreasing throughout the money cycle. Figure  shows an example of a
simple money cycle.
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Figure : A simple money cycle. e symbols q, z and x denote production, real balances
of money holdings, and consumption respectively.
e Euler equation is important for characterizing the equilibrium.

Lemma . If x, x0, and z0 > 0 are optimal choices at some money balance z, then then
u0 (x) =

1 + 
u0 (x0) : ()
Proof. When z0 > 0, the agent can change today’s consumption x to x+  and tomorrow’s
consumption x0 to x0 (1+)without violating any no-credit constraints, for  suﬃciently
close to zero. e agent’s lifetime value changes by
[u(x+ )  u(x)] + [u(x0   (1 + ))  u(x0)]:
Since the agent rejects any such deviation,  = 0maximises this value change, so the ﬁrst-
order condition () holds.
e ﬁrst-order condition
u0 (x) = c0 (q) ()
applies on work days (when q > 0).
Deﬁnition . We say that an agent’s decisions (fqtg ; fxtg ; fztg) follow a money cycle of
length n > 0 if n is the smallest number such that zt = zt+n for all t. We say that the money
cycle is non-trivial if n > 1.
eorem . In every symmetric stationary monetary equilibrium away from the Friedman
rule (i.e. for 1+  > ), agents’ decisions follow a (possibly trivial) money cycle that contains
0money holdings. Every agent cycles through the same sequence.
Proof. Suppose (fqt g ; fxtg ; fzt g) is an optimal solution to the agents’ problem.We argue
below that fzt g includes 0 for some t. By truncating the start of the sequences, we repeat
the argument to conclude that zt includes a second 0. In a stationary equilibrium, the same
decisions are taken whenever zt = 0. We conclude that the entire sequence of decisions
between the ﬁrst and second time zt = 0 is repeated over and over to form a money cycle.
Since every agent’s sequence of money holdings zt includes 0 and all agents follow the same
policies in symmetric equilibria, it follows that every agent follows the same sequence of
decisions. erefore, it suﬃces to show that fzt g includes 0 for some t.
For the sake of contradiction, suppose that zt > 0 for all t. In this case, the Euler equa-
tion () applies every period so that
u0 (x1) =

1 + 
u0 (x2) =    =


1 + 
t 1
u0 (xt ) : ()
When the money growth rate is above the Friedman rule (i.e. 1 +  > ), the ﬁrst term
on the right side converges to 0, so u0 (xt ) ! 1 and hence xt ! 0. Due to the Inada

condition, this implies u(xt )!  1 and hence V (zt )!  1. However V () is bounded
below by the autarky payoﬀ of
max
x
1
1   [u(x)  c(x)] :
is contradiction implies that the premise that zt > 0 for all t is false.
Note that there may be multiple stationary equilibria. In this case, it would also be an
equilibrium for agents to switch from one money cycle to another. However, such an equi-
librium is not stationary.
e following corollary shows that a trivial money cycle (in which agents always hold
zero real-balances of money) can not be a monetary equilibrium. Rather, trivial money
cycles give rise to autarky.
Corollary .. In every trivial money cycle equilibrium (with length one), money has no
value.
Proof. As shown above, every money cycle includes zero.is implies that each agent’s real
balance is zt = 0 in every period t. is means that the real value of the money stockMt
is 0, which is only possible if money has no value (i.e. pt =1).
Next, we show that the distribution of money holdings is non-degenerate, but has a
simple structure.is is because agents trade positions with each other in the money cycle.
Corollary .. In every symmetric stationary equilibrium, the distributionF of (real balances
of) money holdings has equal mass over a ﬁnite set.
Proof. e support of the distribution of real balances coincides with the equilibrium se-
quence of real balances. Since each agent cycles through the sequence at the same pace, the
measure of agents at each point of the sequence is equal, so the stationary distribution has
equal mass at each point in its support.
Without loss of generality, we say that the start of the money cycle is when agents hold
no money. e following theorem summarizes the properties of money cycles.
eorem . In every stationary equilibrium away from the Friedman rule (i.e. 1 +  < ),
agents proceed through money cycles that
(i) have decreasing consumption, with marginal utility increasing in proportion to the in-
ﬂation tax, (1 + ) /.

(ii) the subsequence of non-zero production quantities is increasing throughout the money
cycle, with (shadow) marginal cost increasing in proportion to the inﬂation tax.
(iii) begin with work and end with vacation.
Proof. (i) Previously, we found the Euler equation () holds between period t and t+1
whenever zt+1 > 0. Since z

t+1 is greater than 0 in every period before the end of a
money cycle, the Euler equation holds between every period within a money cycle.
e Euler equation implies consumption decreases with marginal utility increasing
in proportion to (1 + ) /.
(ii) Follows from part (i) and the production ﬁrst-order condition ().
(iii) Since the agent begins a money cycle with no money, it must work to ﬁnance its ﬁrst
period consumption (which is the highest level of consumption in the cycle by part (i)
and hence can not be ﬁnanced by transfers).
Suppose the agent works in the last period. Since production is greater or equal to
consumption in the ﬁrst period, parts (i) and (ii) imply that production is strictly
greater than consumption in the last period.is contradicts the conclusion that sav-
ings are 0 in the last period.
e following corollary shows that when agents face a constant marginal production
cost, a Baumol-Tobin style work-vacation pattern such as the example in Figure  emerges
endogenously.
Corollary .. If c (q) is aﬃne on (0;1), then money cycles contain only one work day.
Proof. Since c0 (qt) = u0 (xt) on work days, and u0 (xt) increases over the money cycle, it
follows that c0 (qt)must increase on work days. But when c (q) is aﬃne, c0 (q) is a constant.
However, if themarginal cost is strictly increasing,money cycles can becomemore com-
plex. We explore complex cycles in the next section.
Prescott et al. () only study equilibria in which agents have access to perfect credit
markets. If agents only had access to money supplied away from the Friedman rule, then
we would expect money cycles would arise: consumption and work would ﬂuctuate inef-
ﬁciently due to the hot-potato eﬀect, and agents’ work weeks would be too short. On the
other hand, households oen have access to other assets like retirement plans, houses, and
mortgages that have a higher return thanmoney. Adjusting ﬁnancial portfolios involve sub-
stantial overheads, so households would use money for short-term smoothing and illiquid

assets for long-term smoothing, as in Alvarez et al. () and Kaplan and Violante ().
In this paper, we focus on a single overhead at a time for simplicity. In future work, we think
it would be interesting to combine the two types of overheads to understand retirement and
work-week allocations arise.
Simplemoney cycles also arise inBaumol (), Tobin (), andMenzio et al. ().
We illustrate the diﬀerences between these money cycles in the following section.
 Refuted Conjectures
In this section, we refute four natural conjectures.
Conjecture : Inﬂation depresses output and trade
Keynes (, p. –) suggested that the opposite ought to be true – that inﬂation might
stimulate trade because idle money loses value. Lucas () discusses the conjecture thor-
oughly and points out that in standard micro-founded monetary models it is true:⁵ the
Friedman rule typically maximizes welfare, and inﬂation reduces production, consump-
tion, and trade. However, Lucas () also cites many models that suggest the opposite,
but “any of these models leads to the distinction of anticipated and unanticipated changes
in money […] None of these models deduces the [opposite of Conjecture ] from assump-
tions on technology and preferences alone.” In our model, this conjecture is true for many
parameter values. For example in Figure , aggregate consumption and production are be-
low the Friedman rule level, x (seeeorem ). However, in Figure , inﬂation stimulates
aggregate consumption and production above the eﬃcient level. In this example, the ﬁxed
cost is high, so that q is very large compared to x, which means the agent would ideally
work very infrequently. However, inﬂation is also high, which in contrast makes the agent
want to have a short money cycle, i.e. work frequently. As a result, the agent works ineﬃ-
ciently oen, and because the marginal cost of production is still relatively low, he doesn’t
reduce his per-shi hours by much. erefore, inﬂation stimulates aggregate production
above the eﬃcient level, and does so without any monetary surprises or asymmetric infor-
mation.
Note that stimulus is distinct from the hot-potato eﬀect. Ennis () was motivated to
study the hot-potato eﬀect in order to ﬁnd amechanism by which inﬂationmight stimulate
output. In his model, the hot-potato eﬀect causes inﬂation to increase the number of trans-
actions, but also to reduce transaction sizes. He does not establish whether the net eﬀect of
inﬂation can ever stimulate aggregate output.
⁵ Earlier in standard overlapping generations models, later in search models such as Lagos and Wright
() and many others.

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Figure : A money cycle with over-production and over-consumption, with u(x) = x0:3,
c(q) = 0:15 + q1:3,  = 0:98 and  = 0:3.
Conjecture : Wealthier agents consume more and produce less
It is natural to expect if consumption and leisure are normal goods, then agents holding
more money would choose more of both. However, eorem  establishes that this is not
true in any money cycle equilibrium: the poorest agents are those at the start of the cycle
without any money. Yet these agents consume the most, and produce the least (other than
those on vacation).
In most of the micro-foundedmonetary literature, the models are too simple to address
this conjecture because all agents hold the same amount of money. But in other models
with a non-trivial distribution of money, the conjecture holds true. In Menzio et al. (),
agents have a discrete choice of whether to be a buyer or seller, which they can smooth out
using lotteries.⁶ Since lotteries incur no overheads, the value functions are concave, and the
policy functions are monotonic. erefore, this conjecture can only fail in a model with
overheads. It is therefore no surprise that in other models with overheads, this conjecture
also fails. In a model of overheads in asset markets, Kaplan and Violante (, ﬁg ) depict
an equilibrium with non-monotonic consumption.
⁶ e use of lotteries to convexify out the buy/sell choice was ﬁrst developed by Faig ().

Conjecture : Money cycles consist of a work spell followed by a vacation spell
In Baumol-Tobin, agents are only active in the ﬁrst period of their cycle. It’s tempting to
conjecture that agents might work several times (due to increasing marginal cost) until
they can aﬀord a vacation at the end of their cycle. But Figure  shows that much more
complicated arrangements can be optimal. A single money cycle contains two work spells
and two vacation spells.
In Menzio et al. (), the agents follow a stochastic version of Baumol-Tobin money
cycle that satisﬁes the conjecture. Agents start their cycle with no money, work once, and
do not work again until they run out of money. When agents run low on money, they play
lotteries rather than working. If lotteries were unavailable, then agents would fall back on
using money to convexify their problem; we expect that for some parameter values, they
would work in multiple spells throughout the cycle.
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Figure : Equilibriummoney cycle and related histogram of money holdings when u (x) =
x0:3, c (q) = 0:1 + q1:5,  = 0:98 and  = 0:01.

Conjecture : Symmetric stationary equilibria always exist
Ineorem , we established that every symmetric stationary equilibrium is a money cycle
equilibrium. But is there always such an equilibrium?We provide a counter-example. In the
counter-example, there is no symmetric stationary equilibrium, but there is an asymmetric
stationary equilibrium in which some agents follow one money cycle, and the other agents
follow a diﬀerent money cycle.
e counter-example is based on the setting in Figure .epreferences and production
technology are the same, but the inﬂation rate is now ﬁxed at  = 0:01445. To establish
that there is no symmetric stationary equilibrium, we plot the symmetric excess demand
correspondence, and show that it jumps over the market clearing point (). In our model,
the only endogenous price is the real value T of the (nominal) monetary transfers that
are used to implement the inﬂation rate . As the value of transfers increases, agents can
aﬀord to consumemore and work less, in which case excess demand would increase. In the
counter-example depicted in Figure , there is no market clearing value of T , so there is no
symmetric stationary equilibrium. However, there are asymmetric equilibria in this setting.
T0
T 
excess demand
Figure : e symmetric excess demand correspondence jumps over the market-clearing
level when u (x) = x0:3, c (q) = 0:1 + q1:5,  = 0:98, and  = 0:01445.
At the jump point T , the agents are indiﬀerent between two diﬀerent money cycle patterns
– one of which involves excess demand and the other which involves excess supply. e
excess demand and excess supply are of approximately equal magnitudes. If slightly more
than half of the population followed one money cycle, and the rest followed the other, then
markets would clear, forming an asymmetric equilibrium.⁷
⁷ We conjecture that there always exists a stationary equilibrium with at most two diﬀerent money cycles
being followed by all agents.

Menzio et al. () establish that a symmetric stationary equilibrium exists in their
economy when there is no inﬂation or deﬂation. In their economy, the policy correspon-
dences are single-valued and continuous, so jumps in the excess demand correspondence of
the kind of Figure  do not arise. If the agents did not have access to perfectly fair lotteries,
then we expect that only asymmetric stationary equilibria would exist for some parameter
values.
 Conclusion
is paper presents one of the simplest models of money possible – there are no search
frictions, no overlapping generations, no cash-in-advance constraints, no nominal rigidities
– just a ﬁxed cost and a credit constraint. One might think it is hopeless to learn anything
from such a trivial model. But we drew several striking conclusions: inﬂation has a “hot
potato eﬀect” leading to front-loading of consumption and under-production onwork days;
inﬂation can stimulate ineﬃciently high economic activity, even in the absence of shocks
or asymmetric information; there is a non-degenerate distribution of money holdings; but
wealthier agents do not necessarily consume more and work less, even when consumption
and leisure are normal goods.
Our goal with this model was not to provide a theory of monetary stimulus or labour
supply, but to understand better the key economic logic of money. Our model contributes
to understanding monetary institutions in two ways. First, the frictions in more complex
models are related to the simpler frictions in our model, and the equilibrium responses to
the complex frictions mirror those in our simpler cousin. For example, the saving patterns
in Kaplan and Violante () mirror those in Baumol () and Tobin (), and our
model suggests how these might change if there were an increasing marginal cost of port-
folio adjustment. Another example is in understanding the role of lotteries in Menzio et al.
(), which were introduced as a technical device to obtain monotone policy functions.
Our model suggests how their equilibria would change if agents faced overheads in playing
lotteries.
Second, if a surprising conclusion of a simple model is quantitatively implausible, this
suggests a course for future research: does the simple friction have a more realistic cousin
that has a similar eﬀect? For example, is there an overhead in some other economic activity
(for example, ﬁnancial portfolio adjustment) that leads inﬂation to have a stimulus eﬀect?

A Liquid Lucas Trees
For purposes of comparison, we adapt the model from Section  by replacing money with
deterministic Lucas trees that are in ﬁxed supply. We show that the analysis above goes
through with minor changes.
Suppose that instead of money, there is a forest of measure A of Lucas trees, which has
an aggregate yield of yA every period. e price of the consumption good in time is pt,
and a measure one forest trades forRt units of consumption good in time t. An agent with
measure a of trees in time t has a value of
Wt (at) = max
qt2R+;xt2R+;at+12R+
u (xt)  c (qt) + W (at+1)
s.t. ptxt + ptRtat+1 = ptqt + pt(Rt + y)at:
()
We focus our attention on equilibria in which Rt = R is a constant. is leads to the
stationary Bellman equation,
W (a) = max
q2R+;x2R+;a02R+
u (x)  c (q) + W (a0)
s.t. x+Ra0 = q + (R + y)a:
()
is Bellman equation can be reformulated to look like (), bymaking the state variable
~a = (R + y)a the value (measured in consumption units) of the forest a:
V (~a) = max
q2R+;x2R+;~a02R+
u (x)  c (q) + V (~a0)
s.t. x+
R
R + y
~a0 = q + ~a:
()
Unless the trees have no yield (i.e. y = 0), this is not an isomorphic representation, because
there is no equivalent transfer termT . Nevertheless, it is clear that the theory from Section 
generalises in a straight-forward way, as the transfers do not play an important role in the
proofs.
On the other hand, this reformulation is confusing for thinking about market clearing
conditions, so we deﬁne equilibrium in terms of the original formulation. Let F be the
measure of agents holding up to a units of forest. e stationary symmetric equilibrium
market clearing conditions are:Z
a0(a)dF (a) = AZ
x(a)dF (a) =
Z
q(a)dF (a) + Ay:

It is straightforward to show that the utilitarian social planner still prefers each agent
to consume x and work either q 2 f0; qg, as before. In other words, since there is an
exogenous endowment available in the economy, a smaller measure of agents need to work
to sustain the same amount of consumption.
If the trees have no yield (y = 0), then the economy is equivalent to a monetary econ-
omy with no inﬂation or deﬂation ( = 0). If trees have a positive or negative yield (y 6= 0),
then the Lucas trees function like money with growth rate  = R
R+y
  1. In other words,
positive yields are like deﬂation and negative yields are like inﬂation.
We observe that the only property of the forest that matters is the aggregate yield. at
is, the equilibria do not change when the size of the forest doubles and the yield of each
tree halves, because agents can bundle two unproductive trees into a single productive tree.
Equilibria can only be eﬃcient if the aggregate yield is a suﬃciently large “subsidy” to sup-
port a return equal to the rate of time-preference.
B Algorithm
e usual approach to calculating dynamic equilibria is to exploit the contraction prop-
erty of Bellman operators to approximate the agent’s value function. However, the discrete
choices make the value function non-concave, and therefore diﬃcult to represent faith-
fully on a computer. Our approach is to try every possible sequence of extensive margin
choices, and to apply eorem  to calculate the optimal choices on the intensive margins,
taking the extensive margins as ﬁxed. e main diﬃculty is that, a priori, there might be
an (uncountably) inﬁnite number of possible extensive margin choices among all possible
money cycles. We solve this problem with eorem , which establishes an upper bound
on the length of a money cycle equilibrium in a given economy, and hence a bound on the
number of possible extensive margin choices the agent has.
eorem . Consider a money cycle equilibrium with inﬂation so that T > 0.
(i) If the agent holds real balances of z1, then
(a) their consumption x1 lies in [T; x1], where x1 = maxfz1 + T; x^g and x^ solves
u0 (x) = c0 (x  z1   T ).
(b) they spend all of their money within the following number of periods,
log
u0 (x1)
u0 (T )

log

1 + 

:
(ii) Since money cycles begin with z1 = 0, the length of money cycles is bounded by this
expression at z1 = 0.

Proof. (i) (a) Clearly x1  T . We need to show that x1  maxfz1+T; x^g. If the agent
does not work in the ﬁrst period, then x1  z1 + T . If the agent works, we will
show that x1  x^. Intuitively, if an agent consumes a lot, then they must also
produce a lot; but as diminishing marginal utility and increasing marginal cost
set in, it becomes suboptimal to increase consumption and production. Since
the agent starts with z1 real balances of money, the budget constraint implies
that q1  x1   z1   T . e ﬁrst-order conditions imply u0 (x1) = c0 (q1).
Moreover, since marginal cost is increasing, c0 (q1)  c0 (x1   z1   T ). us,
u0 (x1)  c0 (x1   z1   T ), or equivalently, x1  x^ since u0 is decreasing and c0
is increasing.
(b) Now suppose that z2; : : : ; zn > 0. We will put an upper bound on n for which
this can be true. Under inﬂation, xn  T > 0. By the Euler equation,
u0 (x1) =


1 + 
n
u0 (xn) :
Substituting the bound for x1 above and the bound xn  T into this equation
gives
u0 [maxfz1 + T; x1g]  u0 (x1) =


1 + 
n
u0 (xn) 


1 + 
n
u0 (T ) ;
which can be rearranged to the bound on n given above.
(ii) Trivial.
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